The decision by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force to purchase only 24 Su-35 fighter jets from the Russia remains a point of debate among defense analysts. Many expected China to scale up procurement after the first batch arrived, particularly because the Su-35 was one of Russia’s most advanced 4++ generation fighters. But Beijing’s decision was deliberate. The PLAAF viewed the Su-35 not as a long-term fleet backbone but as a temporary capability bridge at a time when China was transitioning rapidly toward indigenous aircraft production. Understanding this decision requires reviewing China’s aviation history, industrial strategy, doctrinal evolution, and the shifting nature of modern air combat.
The Su-27 and Su-30 Legacy Shaped China’s Thinking
China’s earlier experience with Russian fighters strongly influenced its restrained approach to the Su-35. The Su-27, which China first acquired in the 1990s, served as the foundation of its modern airpower renaissance. China not only imported Su-27s but also assembled them locally, gaining exposure to Russian manufacturing methods. Over time, China absorbed the aerodynamic design philosophy and systems integration experience from the Su-27 and used that knowledge to develop its own J-11B series. This created confidence that China could transition from Russian designs to domestic derivatives.
The Su-30, acquired in the late 1990s and early 2000s, reinforced that confidence. It introduced China to long-range maritime strike missions, heavy multirole operations, advanced radar modes, and modern air-to-air missile integration. Much of that experience was later replicated and expanded in the Chinese-built J-16. By the time the Su-35 was offered, China had already extracted decades of value from the Su-27 and Su-30 families. Beijing saw diminishing returns in continuing deep reliance on Russian platforms, especially when the PLAAF had mastered the transition toward domestic fighters that could match and sometimes surpass their Russian predecessors.
The Su-35 as a Temporary but Useful Acquisition
When China signed the contract for 24 Su-35s in 2015, the fleet was intended to fill an immediate operational gap. The Su-35 offered exceptional maneuverability, improved radar range, advanced IRST performance, and long-endurance maritime patrol capability. It was particularly relevant during a period when China was accelerating its territorial air patrols over the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. But the PLAAF always viewed the Su-35 as a short-term asset rather than a long-term structural investment. The aircraft was never treated as a successor to the Su-27 or Su-30 in the way the J-11B or J-16 were. Instead, it was a temporary injection of capability as China refined and expanded its next-generation fighter programs.
Rapid Advancement of Indigenous Fifth-Generation Fighters
The most decisive factor behind China’s limited Su-35 purchase was the rapid progress of the J-20 program. Once the J-20 achieved operational capability, Chinese strategic planners shifted emphasis away from foreign fighters to a future shaped by stealth, sensor fusion, and network-enabled combat. The Su-35 was technologically impressive but still a non-stealth platform, and China had no interest in anchoring its future around a fighter that could be detected earlier than its own fifth-generation aircraft. As the J-20 entered serial production and the upcoming J-35 fighter gained momentum, funding, manpower, and industrial capacity were redirected toward these domestic platforms. The PLAAF saw greater long-term value in expanding indigenous fifth-generation fleets rather than buying more 4++ generation aircraft from abroad.
Economic Logic Was Firmly in Favor of Domestic Fighters
Although China has one of the world’s largest defense budgets, its procurement philosophy remains highly cost-efficient. The Su-35 came at a premium price, and each additional batch would have consumed funds that could instead accelerate domestic production lines where China maintains cost control, manufacturing sovereignty, and export freedom. At the time of the Su-35 purchase, the cost per aircraft was substantially higher than domestically produced fighters like the J-10C or J-16, making a large Russian procurement financially undesirable. For a country aiming to field hundreds of stealth fighters and expand maritime strike capability, relying on expensive foreign imports did not fit China’s long-term modernization model.
Industrial Self-Reliance as a Strategic Imperative
A core element of China’s defense modernization is reducing dependence on foreign weapons systems. The Su-27 and Su-30 acquisitions had given China valuable exposure to Russian aviation technology, but they also revealed the vulnerabilities of relying on external suppliers for engines, avionics, and upgrades. The Su-35 deal did not include any deeper technology transfer that would allow China to gain new industrial insights beyond what it already understood from earlier Russian fighters. Without such transfer, expanding Su-35 procurement would simply prolong China’s dependency. The PLAAF’s strategic leadership favored building a fleet that China could sustain and upgrade on its own terms, without political or logistical constraints from Moscow.
Fleet Standardization Was More Valuable Than Expanding a Foreign Type
As China’s air force expanded, the need for fleet commonality became more important than ever. Domestic fighters like the J-10, J-11B, and J-16 shared supply chains, maintenance philosophies, and training ecosystems. The Su-35, as an imported aircraft, created an isolated maintenance and logistics bubble that was difficult to expand efficiently. Increasing the number of Su-35s would have complicated pilot conversion pipelines, spare parts storage, engine support, and long-term sustainment planning. China viewed such fragmentation as counterproductive during a period of accelerated modernization. A lean foreign fleet was easier to manage than a large one that conflicted with China’s goal of a fully integrated indigenous airpower structure.
The Su-35 Was Valuable for Learning, But Only Once
One of the PLAAF’s historical procurement strategies has been acquiring select foreign platforms to study and reverse-engineer their strengths. The Su-27 and Su-30 were prime examples of this approach. The Su-35 similarly offered valuable lessons in thrust-vectoring engines, wide-aperture radar design, aerodynamic refinements, and infrared search technology. But once these lessons were absorbed, buying more Su-35s became unnecessary. China already had domestic research programs exploring similar or superior technologies. The value of the Su-35 was in giving China a reference point, not in becoming a long-term fleet mainstay.
Geopolitical Realities Limited Expansion
While Sino-Russian defense relations remain cooperative, they are shaped by careful political calculation. Russia has remained protective of its most sensitive aviation technologies, particularly engine manufacturing. China, meanwhile, has grown increasingly wary of relying on Russian sustainment and parts supplies. Expanding Su-35 purchases could have created new long-term dependencies at a time when China is seeking full strategic autonomy. Both countries prefer a relationship where each gains value without giving away core industrial advantage, and this careful balance naturally restricted the scale of the Su-35 deal.
Shifting Air Combat Requirements Reduced the Su-35’s Appeal
Global airpower trends have moved toward stealth, long-range missiles, drone integration, advanced electronic warfare, and AI-driven sensor fusion. The Su-35 excels in supermaneuverability and long-range engagements but lacks low observability and deep integration with modern digital battle networks. China’s future warfighting doctrine, especially against technologically advanced adversaries, emphasizes first-strike advantages enabled by stealth and sensor dominance rather than close-range maneuvering. The Su-35, while a formidable platform in traditional air combat, does not fully align with emerging doctrines that shape China’s aviation future.
Current Status of Su-35 Operations in the PLAAF
China continues to operate all 24 Su-35s delivered between 2016 and 2018. They are believed to be deployed primarily within the Southern Theater Command, where they execute long-range patrols, maritime monitoring, and interception missions. The aircraft are frequently observed conducting air patrols around Taiwan and the South China Sea. Although they remain highly capable, the Su-35s serve in a concentrated role that complements China’s domestic fighters rather than competing with them. Their presence enhances readiness and provides the PLAAF with valuable operational data, but China has shown no interest in expanding the fleet beyond its original size.
Conclusion: Su-35 Restraint Represents Strategic Confidence
The PLAAF’s limited Su-35 acquisition reflects a confident and maturing airpower strategy. China extracted technological insights, filled short-term operational gaps, and strengthened defense ties with Russia without compromising long-term autonomy. The country’s experience with Su-27 and Su-30 fighters laid the foundation that allowed China to move beyond dependency on Russian platforms. Today, indigenous aircraft like the J-20 and J-16 drive China’s modernization path, while the Su-35 remains a capable but deliberately limited component of the overall force.
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